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In	1955,	Britain	had	the	chance	to	shape	the	future	EU.
It	flunked	it
Negotiating	with	the	EU	was	never	going	to	be	successful,	because	the	EU’s
interest	is	in	protecting	the	advantages	its	members	enjoy.	In	their	book	How	to
Lose	a	Referendum:	the	definitive	story	of	why	the	UK	voted	for	Brexit,	Paul
Goldsmith	(left)	and	Jason	Farrell	explain	why	the	failure	of	British	politicians
to	explain	why	the	compromises	of	EU	membership	were	worthwhile	made	Vote
Leave’s	promise	to	‘take	control’	so	appealing.
Every	time	a	UK	politician	refers	to	there	being	a	‘negotiation’	with	the	European	Union	in	which	both	sides	might
compromise,	think	of	the	man	who	negotiated	our	entry.	Con	O’Neill	went	to	negotiate	on	behalf	of	the	UK	with	the
European	bloc	and	met	a	brick	wall.
O’Neill	was	the	Olly	Robbins	of	his	day,	a	lifelong	civil	servant	who	was	Britain’s	chief	official	negotiator	when	it
joined	the	then	European	Community	in	the	early	1970s.	These	days	we	would	refer	to	O’Neill	as	a	“Sherpa”	–	the
guy	doing	the	heavy	lifting	behind	the	scenes.	His	account	of	the	process	remained	secret	for	many	years,	and	for
good	reason.	‘Britain’s	Entry	into	the	European	Community:	Report	on	the	Negotiations	of	1970-1972’,	was	not
published	until	September	2000.
A	British	map	of	Belgium	from	the	1950s.	Photo:	Nathan	Hughes	Hamilton	via	a	CC	BY	2.0
licence
Certain	quotes	stand	out.	In	O’Neill’s	view,	the	whole	negotiation	was	‘peripheral,	accidental	and	secondary’	because
of	the	imperative	that	Britain	should	join	the	Continent:	‘What	mattered	was	to	get	into	the	Community.’	Therefore,
the	only	possible	approach	to	the	negotiations	could	be	‘Swallow	the	lot,	and	swallow	it	now’.
What	stood	out	less,	but	is	important	in	the	context	of	what	the	UK	is	trying	to	achieve	in	today’s	Brexit	negotiations,
is	the	explanation	for	why	everything	had	to	be	swallowed.	It	was	not	because	of	malice	or	political	enmity,	said
O’Neill,	but	because	‘almost	every	conceivable	Community	policy	…	is	the	resultant	of	a	conflict	of	interests	between
members,	and	has	embedded	in	it	features	representing	a	compromise	between	the	interests’.	If	it	were	to	be
opened	up,	just	because	the	British	had	a	strong	argument,	the	whole	laborious	compromise	would	fall	apart.
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This	“laborious	compromise”	is	documented	and	known	as	the	acquis	communautaire	–	the	range	of	decisions,
policies,	rules	and	treaties	already	agreed.	Back	in	1970,	it	was	30,000	pages;	today	it’s	80,000.	Printed	out,	it	would
weigh	a	tonne.	The	acquis	that	O’Neill	was	trying	to	join	in	1970	was	simpler	than	the	one	Robbins	is	now	trying	to
get	us	out	of	in	2018.	However,	it	already	included	the	outcome	of	the	1964	legal	cases	that	established	the
European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	as	the	supreme	legislative	body,	over	and	above	that	of	nation	states,	and	the
Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP),	the	system	of	subsidies	and	price	controls	that	benefitted	countries	with	larger
farming	sectors	like	France	and	Italy.
It	also	included	the	Common	Fisheries	Policy	(CFP),	rather	cheekily	signed	at	9am	in	the	morning	of	30	June	1970
when	the	applications	from	the	UK,	Ireland,	Denmark	and	Norway	were	received,	and	pooling	all	the	fish	in	the
enlarged	EC,	knowing	full	well	that	the	new	applicants	possessed	over	80%	of	them.	It	also	included	the
arrangements	for	how	the	EC’s	budget	was	funded,	among	them	all	the	tariffs	collected	from	countries	outside	the
EC	(a	considerable	amount	for	a	small	country	like	the	UK,	which	imported	over	50%	of	its	agricultural	goods)	and
one	percent	of	each	country’s	VAT	receipts	–	a	tax	that	the	UK	did	not	even	have	at	the	time.
As	we	explain	in	our	book	How	to	Lose	a	Referendum:
The	Definitive	Story	of	Why	the	UK	Voted	for	Brexit,	this
meant	considerable	economic	and	political	contortions	in
order	for	Britain	to	join	in	1973,	and	they	have	continued
ever	since.	Yet	the	full	extent	of	those	contortions	were
not	understood	at	the	time	of	accession	and	not	laid	bare
until	O’Neill’s	document	was	declassified	in	2000.
Fast	forward	to	the	2016	EU	referendum	campaign.	Think
about	the	most	effective	slogan	from	it:	‘Take	control’.
Both	Dominic	Cummings,	campaign	director	of	Vote
Leave,	and	Will	Straw,	executive	director	of	Stronger	IN,
admit	in	interviews	for	our	book	that	floating	voters	could,
unprompted,	name	the	ability	to	take	back	control	of
money,	borders	and	laws	as	the	main	arguments	for
leaving	the	EU.	Straw	recounts	the	findings	of	a	series	of
focus	groups	in	the	summer	of	2015	in	which	these
undecided	voters	‘couldn’t	tell	you	a	single	tangible	thing
that	was	good	about	the	EU	for	them	and	their	family’.	All
they	had	was	a	vague	idea	that	the	EU	was	good	for	the
UK	economy	without	being	able	to	explain	how	or	why.
Thus	was	the	Remain	campaign’s	‘Project	Fear’	focus	on
the	economy	born.	It	was	the	only	option	in	the	time
available.
‘Take	back	control’	was	so	effective	because	it	was	easy
to	point	to	and	explain	the	extent	to	which	the	UK	had	lost
control	of	those	things	when	they	joined	the	EC	and	then
took	part	in	the	rapid	economic	and	political	integration
from	the	mid-1980s	to	the	end	of	the	2000s,	in	which	time
the	Single	Market	Act,	and	then	the	Maastricht,
Amsterdam,	Nice	and	Lisbon	Treaties	reduced	the
national	veto,	created	monetary	union,	introduced	the
concept	of	EU	citizenship,	welcomed	the	11	countries
from	Eastern	Europe	plus	Malta	and	Cyprus	and	opened
Britain’s	borders	to	mass	migration	from	the	EU.	At	no
point	during	the	43	years	between	joining	and	the	2016
referendum	did	a	political	leader	spend	the	time	or	energy
to	properly	explain	the	benefits	of	all	this	to	the	British
people.
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This	left	a	vacuum,	which	was	filled	by	people	who	claimed	that	a	myriad	of	problems	could	be	solved	by	leaving	the
EU,	without	allowing	for	the	possibility	that	much	could	be	lost	at	the	same	time.	A	central	part	of	the	Leave
campaign’s	claims	was	that	the	nation	states	of	the	EU	would	be	lining	up	to	make	concessions	to	keep	the	UK’s
market	open	to	them.	Boris	Johnson	claimed	during	the	final	TV	debate	of	the	referendum:	‘Everybody	knows	that
this	country	receives	about	a	fifth	of	Germany’s	entire	car	manufacturing	output	–	820,000	vehicles	a	year.	Do	you
seriously	suppose	that	they	are	going	to	be	so	insane	as	to	allow	tariffs	to	be	imposed	between	Britain	and
Germany?’	Yet	when	he	became	Foreign	Secretary,	Johnson	was	swiftly	disabused	of	this	notion	during	a
conversation	with	Carlo	Calenda,	a	former	Italian	envoy	to	Brussels.	Johnson	had	suggested	to	Calenda	that	Britain
would	want	access	to	the	single	market	without	accepting	freedom	of	movement.	He	told	Calenda	that	if	Italy	denied
the	UK	this	access	“you’ll	sell	less	prosecco”.	Calenda	responded	“OK,	but	you’ll	sell	less	fish	and	chips,	and	while	I’ll
sell	less	prosecco	to	one	country,	you’ll	sell	less	to	twenty-seven	countries”.’
In	truth	no	country	within	the	EU	can	have	the	economic	benefits	of	integration	without	the	economic	and	political
obligations.	As	Con	O’Neill	pointed	out,	every	single	part	of	the	way	the	European	Union	works	is	the	result	‘of	a
conflict	of	interests	between	members,	and	has	embedded	in	it	features	representing	a	compromise	between	the
interests’.	All	along,	the	UK	has	tried	to	prise	these	agreements	open	to	get	its	way:	David	Cameron	with	his	2016
negotiations,	Margaret	Thatcher	achieving	(at	considerable	cost	of	goodwill)	a	rebate	on	the	UK’s	budget
contributions),	the	tiny	incremental	concessions	of	Harold	Wilson’s	attempted	re-negotiation	before	the	1975
referendum,	and	the	failed	attempts	to	join	in	1963	and	1967	(when	French	President	Charles	de	Gaulle	insisted	on
the	importance	of	the	UK	putting	Europe	first).
There	was	one	chance,	one	occasion	when	everything	was	on	the	table.	It	was	in	1955,	and	the	UK	had	been	invited
to	the	Spaak	Committee	meetings	to	negotiate	and	create	the	original	European	Community.	Asked	to	send	its
Foreign	Secretary,	Harold	Macmillan	(as	everyone	else	was	doing),	the	UK	instead	sent	a	civil	servant,	Russell
Bretherton.
Bretherton	was	the	Con	O’Neill	and	Olly	Robbins	of	his	day.	However	he	was	not	even	a	negotiator,	and	he	was	not
working	alongside	any	minister.	He	attended	the	meeting	with	strict	instructions	not	to	agree	to	anything.	Bretherton
knew	very	quickly	he	was	the	wrong	man	in	the	right	place.	Among	the	many	missives	he	wrote	to	his	political
masters	was	the	warning	that	‘If	we	are	prepared	to	take	a	firm	line,	that	we	want	to	come	in	and	will	be	a	part	of	this,
we	can	make	this	body	into	anything	we	like.	But	if	we	don’t	say	that,	something	will	probably	happen	and	we	shan’t
exercise	any	influence	over	it.’
Russell	Bretherton	was	right.	By	1972	Con	O’Neill	was	confirming	that	it	was	too	late	to	influence	the	workings	of
what	was	to	become	the	European	Union.	One	has	to	assume	that	in	2018	the	EU	won’t	negotiate	on	this	either.	The
special	trade	relationship	the	UK	seeks	would	be	a	compromise	with	a	non-member	that	threatens	the	“laborious
compromise”	agreed	over	years	by	the	remaining	27	members.	Expecting	UK	civil	servants	to	change	this	is	part	of	a
long	tradition;	it	is	also	pie	in	the	sky.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
Paul	Goldsmith	is	a	politics	and	economics	teacher	at	Latymer	Upper	School	in	London.	Jason	Farrell	is	Sky	News
senior	political	correspondent.	They	are	co-authors	of	How	to	Lose	a	Referendum:	The	Definitive	Story	of	Why	the
UK	Voted	for	Brexit	–	published	by	Biteback.	They	will	be	discussing	the	book	with	Prof	Tony	Travers	at	the	LSE	on
4	June	2018	at	6.30pm:	more	details	of	the	event	are	here.
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